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Towards a New Model for Early Warning Signals for Crises 
An Application to OECD Countries 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The prohibitive historic cost of crises, the cost of the recent three year financial crisis with output loss 
estimates in excess of USD10.0 trillion of ‘opportunity loss’ global GDP and direct write downs of USD3.4 
trillion by agents, and the pursuant structural changes which have taken place in the global economy 
highlight the importance of early warning systems for fragility. Previously existing models had failed 
miserably to signal warnings for the 2007-2010 crisis and this failure could be partly attributed to the 
dependent and independent variable specifications and empirical model design as this research demonstrates. 
Using a signal extraction framework and looking at OECD countries over a 30 year period this paper attempts 
to identify a number of variables significant in predicting near-crises as a pre-cursor to full-fledged crises. 
These include growth in pension assets as an indicator for the development of liquidity bubbles, equity market 
dividend yields as a proxy for corporate balance sheet health, banking sector assets growth and relative size to 
GDP. We also study the development of asset price bubbles through an equity markets indicator and a house 
price indicator. Finally we also look at a banking sector funding stability indicator and liquidity indicator on a 
micro-level. Simultaneously, a dynamic research design improves on previous static set-ups and enhances the 
model predictive power and applicability to different time periods. 
 
This paper shows that as early as 2004, clear signals were being given for a number of countries that 
vulnerabilities were building up with out-of-sample performance better than in-sample in terms of overall 
noise to signal ratios, showing a significant improvement compared to earlier work. EWS design has 
significant implications for financial stability and financial regulation.   
 
 
Key words: financial crises, financial fragility, liquidity bubbles, early warning signals, financial stability, 
financial regulation. 
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1. Introduction 
The recent crisis highlighted the failure of former early warning signals models, using a sample of 105 
countries, covering the years 1979 to 2003, Davis & Karim (2008) apply macro EWS models, using signal 
extraction, Logit and binary recursive tree methodologies, to US and UK data to test for out-of-sample 
performance (whether a crisis was correctly called) from 2000 – 2007. They find that for the US, both models 
fail miserably with a probability of a crisis occurring in 2007 of 1% for the Logit model and 0.6% for the 
binary tree model. For the UK, the results were similar, with the Logit probability of a crisis at 3.4% in 2007 
and 0.6% for the binary tree model. This paper attributes this failure partly to dependent variable and 
independent variable specification and model empirical design, all three areas which we attempt to improve 
on.  
 
Commonly used dependent variable specifications in the past are ex-post measures of the cost of crises in 
the form of direct bailout funds or indirect GDP losses compared to its previous growth trajectory (Davis & 
Karim 2003). Caprio and Klingebiel (1996) find bailouts cost on average 10% of GDP, with some crises 
much more damaging like the Mexican Tequila Crisis (1994) which cost 20% of GDP, and the Jamaican 
crisis (1996) which cost 37% of GDP. According to the IMF, the past crisis of 2007 - 2010 had cumulative 
(indirect) output losses over 2008-2010 estimated at around 5% of global output (this amounts to around 
USD10.2 trillion if we apply the rate to IMF global output estimates), while direct bailout measures by 
governments have almost tallied a similar figure and direct write-downs by agents tallied some USD3.4 
trillion. These collectively are equivalent to 40% of global GDP in 2010. 
 
However, given that there is a substantial body of literature that highlights the linkage between the build-up of 
financial fragility and crises, this motivated our research into the precursor to crises, namely the build-up of 
financial vulnerabilities. In their book Crisis Economics Roubini and Mihm (2010) consistently highlight the 
linkage between financial fragility, the build up of imbalances and systemic financial crises and conclude that 
financial crises would not result in system wide distress in the absence of financial fragility. While Gonzalez-
Hermosillo (1999) and Jagtiani, Kolari, Lemieux & Shin (2003) prove that low capital adequacy and a fragile 
banking sector is a leading indicator of banking distress, signalling a high likelihood of near-term bank 
failure. Furthermore, Cihak & Shaeck (2007) confirm the importance of bank profitability for the detection of 
systemic banking problems. Therefore, a dependent variable specification which focuses on ex-ante 
prediction, on banking sector fragility, as measured by capital adequacy and banking sector profitability was 
intuitive to us. As a measure it is also both necessary and sufficient for the prediction of full- fledged crises, 
but not vice versa. This dependent variable could be viewed as a ‘Near crisis’. By focusing on ‘near crises’, 
the model is calibrated to detect a pre-crisis and in turn would give policy makers more lead time to avert or at 
least minimize crises costs. This way the EWS would be credible and usable by policy makers, and thus 
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effective. Also the specification of the dependent variable to signal near-crises, means that a lot of data which 
was not previously utilized in an EWS analysis will now be taken into account. 
 
Focusing on independent variable specifications, these evolved in earlier literature over three generations of 
thought. The first generation (Kaminsky and Reinhart 1999 is an example) was based on macro weaknesses 
and relied on macro-economic indicators as explanatory variables such as real GDP growth, real exchange 
rates, current account balance, inflation, etc. Second generation was based on self-fulfilling prophecies and 
herding behaviour using explanatory variables such as changes in real interest rates or changes in interest rate 
spreads which could signal changes in agent expectations. These include work by Flood and Garber (1984) 
and Obstfeld (1986), and Claessens (1991). Finally, third generation such as Krugman (1999), Bris and 
Koskinen (2000) and Cabellero and Krishnamurthy (2000) was based on contagion and spill-overs from other 
countries or markets which used explanatory variables such as changes in capital flows, changes in trade 
flows, in addition to other variables. Thus independent variable use spanned across macro factors, micro 
factors, a combination of both, on an endogenous and exogenous level as the case may be.  
 
The choice of independent variables for this paper was as such guided to include exogenous and endogenous 
variables representative of all three schools and across all the different classifications. We look at real GDP 
growth, banking sector asset growth, the level of banking sector assets to GDP, development of asset price 
bubble indicators (a house price indicator and an equity capital markets indicator), a dividend yield indicator 
as a proxy for the health of the corporate sector, a banking sector liquidity indicator and a banking sector 
funding indicator as micro structural indicators for the industry, and a pension funds to GDP indicator as a 
proxy for the development of liquidity bubbles. 
 
The specific empirical model designs used to predict crises fall into four categories: i) signals models; ii) 
logit/probit models; iii) Merton type models; and a less used class of models, iv) Binary recursive trees. In 
this paper we use a signal extraction methodology. Predominantly in earlier literature such as Kaminsky and 
Reinhart 1999 and Alessi & Detken 2008, the structure of the signal extraction model was based on a static 
threshold chosen for each independent variable determined on the basis of minimizing Type I and Type II 
errors in-sample for this variable or in other words minimizing the Noise-To-Signal Ratio (NSTR - which 
itself is another way of summarizing a trade-off between Type I and Type II errors) and assessing the 
probability of a crisis conditional a signal being issued. This paper improves on empirical design substantially 
with the choice of variable thresholds no longer static, but rather dynamic in the form of standard deviations 
from a chosen metric which in this case has been chosen as a long-run mean for a variable (this is somewhat 
similar to Borio and Drehmann (2009) who use gap analysis from a long term trend but for only two 
independent variables). By shifting the analysis to focus on standard deviations as opposed to absolute values, 
this model focuses on capturing volatility in a chosen variable, rather than thresholds chosen on the basis of 
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output of a certain data period. This means that the model design as such is usable in different time periods 
and different states of the world.  
 
One of the problems with earlier models is that repeated exercises for different time periods always resulted in 
different performance of a fixed set of indicator variables. This is because causes for crises change over time 
and also because static thresholds chosen for each variable to signal a crisis are by default linked to whichever 
data period they were calibrated to. This explains why in-sample performance of these models was much 
better than out-of-sample and why the old models failed to predict the last crisis. The design of our model to 
read deviations from a chosen benchmark means that the chosen variables are valid for the data period for 
which the model was designed and for other data periods as well, thus improving on out-of-sample 
performance, another major weakness in earlier models.  
 
The results of this paper using a signal extraction methodology for the set of 30 OECD countries over a 30 
year period show a number of variables to be significant in predicting near-crises. These include growth in 
pension assets (significant at the 5% level for the base case), an indicator for the development of liquidity 
bubbles which leads to financial sector pains. While equity market dividend yield was significant at the 10% 
level for the base case. This is a proxy for corporate balance sheet health on the premise that companies 
usually raise dividends, in line with the pecking order hypothesis as free cash flows to equity shareholders, 
after debt service, are available. Banking sector assets growth was also significant at the 10% significance 
level for the base case, indicating a strong relationship between the rapid growth of the banking sector and the 
development of vulnerabilities (positive coefficient). Micro banking sector funding and liquidity indicators 
also improve the overall predictive ability of the model. 
  
The output model shows that as early as 2004, clear signals were being given for a number of countries that 
vulnerabilities were building up. The best in-sample model for the base case, is the 3-year rolling one standard 
deviation specification. Performance out-of-sample, is better than in-sample in terms of overall noise to signal 
ratios, with the range falling from 0.7 to 0.63 for the base case. Levels of Type I errors are also very low 
ranging from a high of 36% to a low of 0% - or no misses.  
 
This paper proposes that we should focus on minimizing Type I error as the optimal regulator objective 
function as this is the most conservative approach and it would ensure continuous action to ensure a sound 
system as such. Although Type II errors might be more, however if the regulator objective is clearly 
formulated to be ‘having a healthy financial system and continually correcting imbalances as they develop’, 
then this is what the model will achieve. This objective is equivalent to ‘avoiding crises at all costs’.  
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The best out-of-sample model for the base case is the 10-year rolling one standard deviation specification 
which results in a noise-to-signal ratio of 0.6 and a Type I error of 0%. These results show a significant 
improvement compared to earlier work, for example the median NSTR in Borio & Drehmann (2009) applied 
to the same period 2004 – 2008, is 0.67 over the three year forecast horizon and the median Type I error is 
30%.  The outperformance also holds in comparison to KLR99, where Type I errors over a two year horizon 
range between 25% for the best individual indicator to 9% for the poorest individual indicator, whereas for 
this model, the corresponding figure is 4% to 0%. Using an adapted dependent variable specification for near 
crises has improved the performance of the model in terms of minimizing Type I errors over a three year 
period and NSTR out-of-sample. Furthermore out-of-sample performance, because of the dynamic set up of 
this model, is better than in-sample performance, a major improvement to previously existing models which 
worked well in-sample, but performed poorly out-of-sample as indicated by Davis and Karim (2008).  
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: section two is a brief literature review; section three 
elaborates on the empirical model design including dependent and independent variable specification; section 
four provides the data and descriptive statistics for the 30 OECD countries; and section five presents the 
empirical results. 
  
2. Brief Literature Review 
 
The signals approach was originally developed by Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), who documented the 
incidence of currency, banking and twin crises (the occurrence of both) in a sample of 20 industrial and 
emerging countries, where crises are identified based on an index of market turbulence developed by 
Eichengreen et al (1995). They describe the behaviour of fifteen macroeconomic variables, each on a stand-
alone basis in the 24 months period preceding and following a crisis compared to non-crisis times. A variable 
is deemed to signal a crisis any time it crosses a certain threshold. If the signal is then followed by a crisis in 
the following 24 months, it is viewed as correct, otherwise a false alarm. Thresholds were chosen to minimize 
the in-sample noise-to-signal ratio. The performance of each signal is evaluated based on three criteria: i) 
associated Type I and Type II error (probability of missing a crisis and probability of a false signal, 
respectively); ii) the noise-to-signal ratio (hereafter NSTR); and iii) the probability of a crisis occurring 
conditional on a signal being issued. The main findings of this paper were that problems in the banking sector 
typically precede a currency crisis, a currency crisis deepens the banking crisis and financial liberalization 
usually precedes banking crises. The evolution of these crises also suggests that crises occur as the economy 
enters a recession, following a prolonged boom in economic activity fuelled by credit, capital inflows at a 
time of currency overvaluation. However, because the sample was chosen to include only countries with fixed 
or heavily managed exchange rates which are usually more prone to currency crashes than other countries, the 
impact of exchange rate on banking crises may have been overemphasized.   
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In more recent research, Borio and Drehmann (2009) develop a composite index and use weights for 
indicators designed based on gaps from a long-term trend, they find that in-sample performance of these 
indicators is quite good, with a lead for crisis prediction varying between one and four years. They also 
examine in depth the choice of optimal indicators, indicator signal thresholds and optimal indicator weights. 
They find that it is possible to build relatively simple indicators comprising credit and asset prices that can 
help identify assessments of the build-up of risks of future banking distress in the economy. They find that in-
sample predictions of crisis average 77% with a lead time of 3 years, while out-of-sample performance falls to 
hover around 60%, for the same lead time. Predictive ability both in-sample and out-of-sample, drops 
considerably in the 1-year lead time analysis to as low as 30%. This seems to highlight that 2 years before a 
crisis occurs, it is already too late to act on preventing the crisis because the preconditions for the crisis have 
already been staged, as evidenced by these indicators seeing no further deterioration. 
Alessi and Detken (2009), using a signal extraction model, find out-of-sample performance of a set of global 
liquidity indicators would have predicted the most recent wave of asset price booms (2005-2007). These 
include global private credit, long term nominal bond yield, housing investment, short-term nominal interest 
rate, real equity price index and real GDP. Table 1 presents a brief description of these papers. 
Table 1: Signal Extraction Selected Papers 
Authors Year Data Factors & Main Findings 
Kaminsky & 
Reinhart 
1998, 
1999 
20 countries, identifying 76 episodes 
of currency crises and 26 banking 
crises, of these 18 episodes are twin 
crises, 1970-1995. 
Find that these three factors are the most influential 
• Real exchange rate appreciation 
• Equity prices 
• Money multiplier 
However, they have a large Type I error, failing to 
issue a signal in 73%-79% of the observations during 
the 24 months preceding the crisis for twin crises and 
12 months for banking crises. 
Alessi & Detken  2008 1970 – 2007, 18 OECD countries. Propose 18 real-time and financial indicators for 
costly asset price booms and find some specifications 
would have issued persistent warning signals prior to 
the current crisis. The most robust indicators were: 
global private credit, long term nominal bond yield, 
housing investment, short-term nominal interest rate, 
real equity price index and real GDP.  
Borio, Drehmann 2009 1980-2003 and test out of sample 
2004 – 2008 
Test the behaviour of credit and asset prices (equity 
and property using gaps from a long-term trend) in the 
prediction of financial crises both in-sample and out-
of-sample, with low noise-to-signal ratios over 1 and 3 
year horizons. 
Sources: As listed above. 
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From Table 1, a key drawback of signal extraction models is clear: across the different time periods and 
countries studied the explanatory variables chosen vary significantly over time and between country 
groupings. Kaminsky and Reinhart (1998) find that real exchange rate appreciation, equity prices and the 
money multiplier are significant variables in predicting crises, while Alessi and Detken (2008) find a set of 18 
real time financial indicators to be significant, of which there is only one overlapping with Kaminsky and 
Reinhart, equity prices, the rest of the variables are different. Alessi and Detken (2008) main significant 
variables in predicting crises are global private credit, long term nominal bond yield, housing investment, 
short-term nominal interest rates, equity price indices and changes in real GDP. Finally, Borio and Drehmann 
(2009) find two indicators to be significant, these are again equity price indices, thus overlapping with Alessi 
and Detkin, and introducing house price indicators as a new variable.  
 
Dependent Variable in Earlier Literature 
Earlier literature (Caprio and Klingebiel 1996 and Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache 1998) defines a crisis ex-
post and after losses are realized and/or public scale nationalization or melt downs occurred – specifically: 
a. Proportion of NPLs to total baking system assets is greater than 10% 
b. Public bailout costs exceed 2% of GDP 
c. Systemic crisis causes large scale nationalization 
d. Extensive bank runs and/or emergency government intervention 
e. All or most of banking capital is exhausted; and 
f. Level of non-performing loans falls between 5% and 10% or less if subjectively deemed 
systemically significant. 
 
The following Table 2 presents the number of crises in line with the definition in earlier literature.  In total we 
have 135 crisis episodes, out of 870 observations or 15.5%.  
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Table 2: Crises Definitions in Earlier Literature for OECD Countries (1980 – 2007) 
 
Sources: Demirgüç-Kunt & Enrica Detragiache (2005), Kaminsky & Reinhart (1999), Caprio & Klingebiel (1996 and 2003) Reinhart 
& Rogoff (2008), Laeven & Valencia (2008). 
 
3. Empirical Model Design 
Methodology 
The indicators are based on a signal extraction method, for each period, t, a signal, S, is calculated which 
takes the value of 1 (“on”) if indicator variables exceed critical thresholds or is 0 (“off”) otherwise. For a 
signal to be issued, critical thresholds which were usually calibrated statically have to be breached and 
aggregating the information issued by different indicators was a challenge. In line with Kaminsky, Lizondo 
and Reinhart (KLR) 1999, who were the creators of this methodology, among others and a later application 
by Borio and Drehmann (2009), we modify this approach by choosing dynamic thresholds measured in 
standard deviations to a benchmark and a signal monitor which summarizes the model output. 
 
The decision rule for whether a variable is ‘on’, i.e. is a ‘1’ or is ‘off’, i.e. is ‘0’, for our chosen explanatory 
variables is based on whether it is a certain number of standard deviations away from a chosen benchmark. 
The benchmark was calculated for three cases as the mean of a 3-year, 5-year and 10-year period of the 
variable in question. These ‘0’ and ‘1’ indicators for each independent variable and for each case are then 
summarized using the ‘SIGNAL MONITOR’ for each country for each year. The number of standard 
deviations to trigger a signal is currently calibrated to read ‘1’ or is ‘On’ if two of the nine variables modelled 
are ‘On’. Thus the crisis prediction process is on two levels: predicting aberrations in the individual variables 
by being too ‘far’ from a rolling mean, and then ‘translating’ or ‘summarizing’ this into a crisis predictor.  
Crises	  Definitions	  in	  Earlier	  Literature
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Total
1 Australia 1 1 1 1 4
2 Austria 0
3 Belgium 0
4 Canada 1 1 1 3
5 Czech	  Republic 0
6 Denmark 1 1 1 1 1 1 6
7 Finland 1 1 1 1 4
8 France 1 1 2
9 Germany 0
10 Greece 1 1 1 1 1 5
11 Hungary 0
12 Iceland 1 1 1 1 1 5
13 Ireland 0
14 Italy 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7
15 Japan 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 12
16 Korea 1 1 2
17 Luxembourg 0
18 Mexico 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 18
19 Netherlands 0
20 Norway 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7
21 New	  Zealand 1 1 1 1 4
22 Poland 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 8
23 Portugal 1 1 1 1 1 5
24 Slovakia 0
25 Spain 1 1 1 1 1 1 6
26 Sweden 1 1 1 1 1 5
27 Switzerland 0
28 Turkey 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 13
29 UK 1 1 1 1 1 5
30 US 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 14
Total 3 7 4 6 6 6 4 6 6 9 9 12 11 8 9 7 3 3 3 2 3 2 2 0 0 2 0 2 135
Total	  Observations 870
15.5%
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The use of standard deviations from a mean is an innovation partly inspired by Borio and Drehmann’s (2009) 
gap analysis, but with methodological changes in the number of variables and how the output is summarized 
and evaluated. The selection of the number of standard deviations that turns the fluctuation in an economic 
time series into a signal is subject to a trade-off. If the cut-off is chosen too ‘tight’ (a small number of 
standard deviations) it is likely to signal a lot of crises, including false ones. This compares to KLR where a 
low absolute is chosen that would increase the number of false signals, i.e. result in Type II errors. On the 
other hand, if the threshold is too high, or set at a large number of standard deviations, it would result in Type 
I errors, missing a crisis when there is one in the making. This compares to KLR where a high absolute 
threshold was chosen. 
 
There is no consensus approach to choosing the size of a threshold. Kaminsky and Reinhart (1996), choose 
the size of the optimal threshold for each variable by selecting the value that minimizes the in-sample 
noise-to-signal ratio, ω, that is computed in their application as follows: 
 ! = !1 − ! 
 
 
Where α is the size of the type I error and β is the size of the type II error, and where both are functions of the 
chosen variable threshold. The NSTR calculation for this paper is calculated in the same way, with the 
difference that now both are functions of the chosen deviation threshold. 
 
Dependent and Explanatory Variables  
Dependent Variable 
This paper uses an adapted definition focusing on near-crises, where each country is identified as having a 
near-crisis or not based on a composite indicator of the solvency and profitability of the banking sector and 
changes in both thereof. By using this definition of near-crises as opposed to an ex-post metric of losses as a 
percentage of GDP or NPL levels which identify crises at a stage which is too late for policy makers to take 
any action to actually prevent a crisis – this adapted near-crisis definition would by default lead to a longer 
lead period for the signals issued as they will point to imbalance and/or fragility build-up. 
 
Dependent Variable Specification, Unbundling and Calibrations  
The dependent variable designed to capture changes to bank solvency and profitability or periods of ‘near-
crisis is composed of four components as follows: 
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1. For any given year for any country, if it saw a decrease in its banking sector capitalization of more 
than a certain number of basis points (delta banking sector capitalization as measured by capital/total 
assets); 
 
2. Or an increase in its banking sector capitalization of more than a certain number of basis points* 
(delta banking sector capitalization as measured by capital/total assets); 
 
3. Or if its net income before provisions as a percentage of average balance sheet falls by more than a 
number of basis points (delta NI before provisions/average balance sheet); 
 
4. Or if its net income before provisions as a percentage of average balance sheet is less than a certain 
number of basis points; 
this country is deemed to be facing a near-crisis or a period of heightened fragility.  
 
The reason the profitability metrics were included as separate components, is to capture any over 
statement of capital or hidden non-performing loans. If these two metrics are really poor, while the 
former two seem robust, then we could potentially be faced with an inflated balance sheet or capital 
base or both. 
 
 
 
 
Notes 
*The use of component two as part of the dependent variable specification was tested separately as an explanatory 
variable based on the intuition that banks would potentially increase their capital ex-ante in anticipation of taking on 
more risk in future. However, when calibrated as such the model performance for the 12 unbundled runs (3 cases plus 
one consolidated times 3 dependent variable specifications unbundled) deteriorated drastically across the board. Which 
led the authors to another potential reasoning, which is that banks increase capital only if they know they have already 
taken on more risk, so this is a ‘post’ or dependent variable. This variable proxies the asymmetry in ‘realizing’ the 
impact of increased risk explicitly on the assets side (i.e. that ‘booking’ the risk happens with a lag after the action of risk 
taking has occurred). The increase in capital/total assets is then the mirror image to the decrease metric, where the assets  
are booked and capital is catching up. We are grateful to Professors Alistair Milne and Steve Thomas of Cass Business 
School for their comments on this particular point.   
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Three cases were considered for the dependent variable calibration as follows:  
 
1. Base Case: changes in banking sector capitalization of more than 0.5% (delta banking sector 
capitalization); net income before provisions as a percentage of average balance sheet falls by 50 bps 
(delta NI before provisions/average balance sheet); or net income before provisions as a percentage of 
average balance sheet is less than 5 bps (0.05% absolute threshold), a country is deemed to be facing 
a banking near-crisis.   
2. High Change Dynamic Threshold: changes in banking sector capitalization of more than 1.0% (delta 
banking sector capitalization); net income before provisions as a percentage of average balance sheet 
falls by 100 bps (delta NI before provisions/average balance sheet); or net income before provisions 
as a percentage of average balance sheet is less than 10 bps (0.10% absolute threshold), a country is 
deemed to be facing a banking near-crisis. 
3. Low Change Dynamic Threshold: changes in banking sector capitalization of more than 0.10% (delta 
banking sector capitalization); net income before provisions as a percentage of average balance sheet 
falls by 10 bps (delta NI before provisions/average balance sheet); or net income before provisions as 
a percentage of average balance sheet is less than 1 bps (0.01% absolute threshold), a country is 
deemed to be facing a banking near-crisis. This is explained more in details in the following Table 3. 
 
Table 3: Unbundling of Near-Crises Definitions by Criteria and Consolidated 
 
*Case calibration is for rules 1 through 4 in order. 
Source: Authors’ calculation. 
 
As table 3 shows, for the base case, the most dominant factor is banking capitalization in line with earlier 
literature, with 206 out of 232 ‘near crisis’ observations being captured by this. The other two factors which 
look at the link between income statement returns and the balance sheet capture only 55 out of the 232 ‘near 
crisis’. This is because if a bank is realizing poor or negative returns it should have already been liquidated or 
merged – so these criteria capture the ‘zombies’ still in the system so to speak, which by default should be 
No. Criteria High	  Change	  Dynamic	  Threshold Base	  Case Low	  Change	  Dynamic	  Threshold
100	  bps,	  100	  bps,	  -­‐100,	  and	  10	  bps 50	  bps,	  50	  bps,	  -­‐50bps	  and	  5	  bps 10	  bps,	  10	  bps,	  -­‐10bps	  and	  1	  bps
1 Decrease	  in	  banking	  sector	  capitalization 45 91 222
2 Increase	  in	  banking	  sector	  capitalization 62 115 265
3
Net	  Income	  before	  provisions/Average	  
Balance	  sheet	  falls 12 36 131
4
Net	  Income	  before	  provisions/Average	  
Balance	  sheet	  is	  less	  than 18 19 22
Sub-­‐total 137 261 640
Less	  Double	  counting	  between	  the	  four	  rules 10 29 131
Net 127 232 509
%	  of	  Total	  Observations 15% 27% 59%
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very few. Please note that there were 29 incidences where more than one criterion captured a ‘near crisis’ and 
the double counting was eliminated.  
 
The use of profitability metrics is to capture any ‘hidden’ factors in asset quality or bank operations, which 
are not evident on the surface just looking at solvency, but are manifested in very low and/or sizable drops in 
profitability. The duration of a near-crisis is one year/ each vulnerability spot is viewed separately.  
 
The High Change Dynamic Threshold and the Low Change Dynamic Threshold scenarios both show very 
low incidence (15%) and very high incidence (59%), of systemic crises respectively and resulted in poorly 
performing models for the 12 runs when tested.  
 
The number of ‘near-crises’ for the base case, by country and year are 232 observations out of 870 or 27% as 
per the following Table 4. The new model proposed identifies a greater number of ‘near-crisis’ as compared 
to full fledged crises identified in earlier literature. This makes sense given that not all near-crises would 
necessarily grow to become crises. But from the perspective of a regulator, this paper puts forward the 
argument that regulators should always be concerned with predicting the ‘near crises’ and working on the 
conditions within their purview to prevent them from developing into crises. 
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Table 4: Near-Crises / Vulnerability Spots Identified for OECD Countries (1980 – 2007)- Base Case* 
 
*As per the rules explained. Source: Author’s calculation. 
The advantage of this definition of near-crises over previous literature is that we gain at least a couple of years 
by doing this based on the underlying assumption that a well capitalized and profitable banking sector can 
better withstand any shock. Also this way the EWS has a pre-emptive built in component because it will 
always ensure a minimum level of ‘sector health’ as it continuously corrects for ‘near-crises’.   
 
The correlation between the predicted total near crises by country in the base case model and full-fledged 
crises in earlier literature is very high at 0.98, which supports the premise on which the new dependent 
variable specification was designed. While Table 5, presents the binary (logit) regression output between the 
definition of crises in earlier literature and the new definition presented in the base case. This shows ‘near-
crises’ as predicting ‘crises’ with a coefficient of 0.61, significant at the 1% level. The model’s MacFadden’s 
R2 is quite low however, at only 1% and the residuals suffer from heteroskedasticity with kurtosis at 4.4 
(normal distribution at around 3).  Thus this relationship could be further investigated in future research. 
 
Table 5: Binary Regression Results between ‘Crisis’ Definitions in Earlier Literature and ‘Near Crises’ OECD Countries 
(1980 – 2007) 
 
Source: Author’s calculation.  
 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Total
1 Australia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 8
2 Austria 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 4
3 Belgium 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3
4 Canada 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
5 Czech	  Republic 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 14
6 Denmark 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 13
7 Finland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 12
8 France 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 3
9 Germany 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
10 Greece 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 5
11 Hungary 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 7
12 Iceland 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 22
13 Ireland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 5
14 Italy 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 6
15 Japan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 10
16 Korea 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 11
17 Luxembourg 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 7
18 Mexico 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 6
19 Netherlands 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 3
20 Norway 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10
21 New	  Zealand 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 9
22 Poland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 7
23 Portugal 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 6
24 Slovakia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 10
25 Spain 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 9
26 Sweden 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 12
27 Switzerland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
28 Turkey 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 12
29 UK 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 6
30 US 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 7
Total 3 2 3 6 5 3 5 3 7 3 8 9 8 15 9 8 10 11 8 11 11 8 14 10 12 11 15 14 232
Total	  Observations 870
%	  Crises 27%
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The explanatory variables 
 
Based on analysis of earlier literature and fundamental analysis, narrowing down the universe to the data set 
which is available for the 30 year period under study- from a long list of 30 variables, nine were chosen after 
proving significant in ‘explaining’ the dependent crisis variable in an OLS model. These nine variables and 
their definitions are presented in the following table. 
 
Table 6: Explanatory Variables 
Acronym Variable Explanation / Rationale for Use    Data Source 
BAG Banking 
Sector Asset 
Growth 
(BAG)  
The faster the growth of banking sector assets, the 
more vulnerable the system could become as the 
quality of lending decisions is affected. (Expected 
sign: Positive) 
OECD database, 
growth calculated 
YoY, end of year 
balance. 
BAGDP 
Banking 
Sector Assets 
to GDP 
(BAGDP) 
The greater the proportion of banking sector assets 
to GDP, the more vulnerable the financial system is 
to any shock in the sector. (Expected sign: Positive) 
Banking Sector 
Assets as above, 
Nominal GDP from 
IMF WEO 
database. 
HPI 
House Price 
Indicator 
(HPI) 
The greater the appreciation in house prices, the 
more likely asset bubbles are to develop and the 
more likely this would negatively impact the 
financial sector. (Expected sign: Positive or 
negative depending on the impact on agents and 
initial conditions) 
OECD database, 
real appreciation in 
house prices YoY. 
PENS 
Pension Fund 
Assets to GDP 
(PENS) 
Pension funds are large liquidity providers in their 
markets, therefore the changes in how much they 
hold as a percentage of GDP indicate how much 
liquidity they are providing to the system. Increases 
could result in more funds poured into the stock 
markets and real estate (contributing to crises by 
bubble development) and drops could mean sale of 
these assets contributing to bubble deflation and 
losses by other agents, resulting in crises if 
substantial.    
(Expected sign: Positive or Negative depending on 
which economic agents are affected and initial 
conditions). 
OECD database, 
pension assets as a 
% of GDP. 
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EMKTDY 
Equity Capital 
Markets 
Dividend 
Yield 
(EMKTDY) 
This is a proxy for corporate leverage, in most 
cases, companies only increase their dividend when 
they have free cash flows to equity shareholders, 
after they have made their debt service and interest 
repayments from free cash flows to the firm as a 
whole. Rising dividend yields should indicate 
healthier corporate balance sheets, and lower crisis 
probability. 
(Expected sign: Negative) 
World Federation of 
Stock Exchanges 
(WFE) 
EMI 
Equity Market 
Index (EMI) 
This is a proxy for stock market appreciation, with 
an expected positive sign. The more price 
appreciation, the greater the possibility that a 
bubble could be forming. 
World Federation of 
Stock Exchanges 
(WFE) 
DRGDP 
Change in 
Real GDP 
(DRGDP) 
Growth in real GDP provides agents with the 
conditions in which they can flourish, build their 
balance sheets and retained earnings from higher 
profits, it results in a boost in capital investment. 
However, growth in real GDP could also result in 
the development of credit and asset price bubbles, 
thus depending on a country’s position in the cycle, 
it can affect the probability of a crisis arising in 
either way. 
 
Expected sign: Positive or Negative. 
WEO database. 
LIQ 
Liquidity 
Indicator 
The proportion of securities to total assets held by 
the financial system as a whole indicates the 
availability of short term liquidity in the system in 
the time of crisis. If there is too much liquidity, it 
could trigger the development of bubbles. If there 
is too little liquidity, this may lead to solvency 
issues. Expected sign: positive or negative. 
OECD database, 
authors’ calculation. 
FUN 
Funding 
Indicator 
The ratio of loans to deposits indicates how much 
of a banks’ loan books are funded by deposits, and 
how much are funded from external sources. The 
greater the proportion funded from external 
sources, the larger the banking system’s exposure 
to changes in market conditions. 
Expected sign: positive or negative (positive if 
above 100%, negative if less than 100%). 
OECD database, 
authors’ calculation. 
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Empirical OLS Model Used to Verify Choice of Variables 
These nine explanatory variables were used to estimate an OLS regression to verify their choice as 
components of the signal indicator, for each of the 30 countries. The models were compared by assessing: i) 
Information criterion (Akaike, Schwarz and Hannan-Quinn); and ii) adjusted !!.  The OLS regression model 
is as follows: 
Crisisi = C + aDRGDPi + bHPIi+ cMEMIi+cBAGi+dBAGDPi+ePENSi+fEMKTDYi+gLIQ+hFUN+ Ei 
 
The best model according to the criteria is presented in the table below.  
 
Table 7: OLS Model 
Variable Coefficient Std Error t-Stat Prob 
C -0.1641 0.4293 -0.3823 0.7034 
DRGDP 4.8779 4.6713 1.0442 0.3001 
HPI -1.0048 1.1245 -0.8897 0.3768 
DEMI 0.3799 0.3356 1.1321 0.2616 
CAB 0.9902 1.0886 0.9096 0.3663 
BAG 1.3807 0.7651 1.8056 0.0756 
BAGDP 0.0458 0.0449 1.0184 0.3121 
PENS -0.3243 0.1646 -1.9704 0.0529 
EMKTDY -4.5277 2.6076 -1.7363 0.0870 
LIQ 0.8912 1.3224 0.6739 0.5026 
FUN 0.0917 0.2322 0.3951 0.6940 
Observations 79    
R-Squared 27.2%    
Adjusted R-Squared 16.5%    
Prob (F-Stat) 1.1%    
 
Source: Authors Calculations. 
 
The model’s adjusted !!, or its explanatory power adjusted for the number of variables incorporated 
is 16.5%, i.e. it explains 16.5% of the results. The overall significance of the model however, as 
indicated by the F-Statistic is 1.1%, indicating the model is significant at the 1% level.  The model 
also provides the smallest information criteria values among the models estimated using various runs 
with different variable combinations from the universe of 30 possible independent variables.  
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Growth in pension assets is positive and significant at the 5% level, and equity market dividend yield 
is positive and significant at the 10% level. The former is an indicator for the development of 
liquidity bubbles which leads to financial sector pains. The latter is a proxy for corporate balance 
sheet health on the premise that companies usually raise dividends, in line with the pecking order 
hypothesis, after meeting all other cash flow needs and when they believe the coming years will be 
better and also as excess free cash flows to equity shareholders, after debt service, are available. 
 
Banking sector assets growth is also significant at the 10% significance level, indicating a strong 
relationship between rapid growth of the banking sector and the development of vulnerabilities 
(positive coefficient). 
 
Other variables not significant at the 10% level but are included in the model as they have correct 
signs and help improve substantially the overall forecasting ability of the model are House Price 
Indicators, mean equity market price rises over a rolling period, a sector micro liquidity indicator 
and a sector micro funding indicator. 
 
4. Data and Descriptive Statistics of Country Universe 
OECD comprises: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom and the 
US. Collectively, these countries captured 75% of global nominal GDP in 2007 (60% on a purchasing-power-
parity adjusted basis) and had a total population of 1.2 billion, 18% of total global population, respectively. 
OECD data on banking activity is available for 30 years, back to 1979 for on-balance sheet activities. The 
data period spans 30 years from 1980 to 2009 with 9 explanatory variables for the 30 OECD countries (this 
translates into approximately 8,000 observations).  
 
This data set is obtained from OECD, IMF, World Bank, World Federation of Exchanges and national central 
banks. In this sample there were 232 years of systemic vulnerabilities for the base case as per the definition 
explained earlier, out of 870 usable observations. Innovation and contribution to data sources includes the use 
of World Federation of Exchanges data on dividend yields as a proxy for corporate sector health and using 
data on fluctuations in pension assets which have not been used before in the literature. Table 8 shows the 
nine variables chosen for this paper and their descriptive statistics. It shows the mean growth in real GDP for 
OECD countries over the study period to be 2.9%, with a standard deviation of 2.7% and a slight skew to the 
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left of 0.5 (normal distribution skewness is approximately zero), and almost normal kurtosis, or no fat tails, 
with kurtosis at 3.46 (normal distribution is approximately three).  
 
Table 8: Data Descriptive Statistics* 
  
*Signal Monitor for the Base Case Dependent Variable Specification, 10 year - 1 SD calibration. 
Source: Authors’ calculation. 
 
The mean of the signal monitor for the base case 10-year rolling mean, 1 SD specification, over the study 
period was 34.3% (i.e 30% of the time a signal was issued based on the decision rule for the current 
calibration of any two signals of the nine pointing to a crisis, this ‘Signal Monitor’ reads 1, otherwise it is 0). 
The standard deviation of the series is 47.5% and a skew to the right of 0.7 (normal distribution skewness is 
approximately zero), and fat tails with kurtosis at negative 1.6 (normal distribution is approximately three). 
These statistics endorse the use of the SIGNAL MONITOR as a summary indicator, because its resulting 
distribution is close to normal given a small skew and slightly negative kurtosis.  
 
5. Empirical Results 
 
Setting Up the Independent Variable Indicator Signals 
For each of the nine variables, a signal is issued if it crosses a threshold theta, Ɵ, which is defined in terms of 
number of standard deviations from a 3-year, 5-year and 10-year  rolling mean for that variable. 
 !! = 1    !"  !! > Ɵ!0  !"#!                            
 
Acronym DRGDP HPI DEMI CAB BAG BAGDP PENS EMKTDY LIQ FUN SIGNAL	  Monitor
Long-­‐Name
Delta	  Real	  GDP	  in	  
%
House	  Price	  
Indicator	  %
Delta	  Equity	  
Market	  Index	  %
Current	  Account	  
Balance	  %
Banking	  Sector	  
Asset	  Growth
Banking	  Sector	  
Assets	  to	  GDP
Pension	  Fund	  
Assets	  to	  GDP
Equity	  Capital	  
Markets	  
Dividend	  Yield
Liquidity	  
Indicator
Funding	  
Indicator Signal	  Monitor
Definition
Change	  in	  Real	  
GDP	  YoY
Real	  
appreciation	  in	  
House	  Prices	  YoY
Change	  in	  eqity	  
capital	  markt	  
index	  YoY
Current	  Account	  
balance	  to	  GDP	  
%
Change	  in	  
banking	  sector	  
assets	  YoY	  %
Banking	  Sector	  
Assets	  to	  GDP	  %
Pension	  Fund	  
Assets	  to	  GDP
Equity	  Capital	  
Markets	  
Dividend	  Yield	  %
Securities	  /	  T.	  
Assets
Loans	  to	  
Deposits	  Ratio
Model	  Output	  
based	  on	  ex-­‐
ante	  decision	  
rule
No.	  Of	  Observations 825 246 691 811 613 649 243 287 481 481 840
Mean 2.87% 3.79% 18.83% -­‐0.70% 13.03% 328.36% 36.18% 3.43% 18.65% 105.08% 34.29%
SD 2.7% 6.0% 45.0% 5.0% 15.3% 655.4% 45.9% 2.9% 6.5% 28.7% 47.5%
Skewness 0.5-­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   0.4	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   5.9	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   0.2	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   3.5	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   3.5	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   2.9	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   4.0	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   0.1	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   0.6	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   0.7	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Kurtosis 3.5 0.7 57.0 1.7 16.1 11.1 19.2 20.8 -­‐0.8 0.7 -­‐1.6
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In the first run, Theta1,  Ɵ!  is calibrated at one-standard deviation from a three year rolling mean. This is 
done for each variable, for each country, for each year. The following table below shows the calibration of 
Theta1 to Theta9: Ɵ!  ,  Ɵ!, Ɵ!, Ɵ!, Ɵ!, Ɵ!, Ɵ! , Ɵ!, Ɵ!. 
 
 
Table 9: Calibration of Signal Triggers 
Run Acronym Rolling Mean Period No. Of Standard Deviations (Signal Trigger) 
Theta1 Ɵ! 3 Years One 
Theta2 Ɵ! 3 Years Two 
Theta3 Ɵ! 3 Years Three 
Theta4 Ɵ! 5 Years One 
Theta5 Ɵ! 5 Years Two 
Theta6 Ɵ! 5 Years Three 
Theta7 Ɵ! 10 Years One 
Theta8 Ɵ! 10 Years Two 
Theta9 Ɵ! 10 Years Three 
 
Source: Authors’ Calculations. 
 
These runs where replicated for each of the unbundled four component dependent variable calibrations, for a 
total of 144 iterations. Independent variable thresholds set at more than one standard deviation (i.e for Theta2 
and Theta3, Theta5 and Theta6 and Theta8 and Theta9) resulted in almost no triggers. This means that if 
standard deviation is calculated on the basis of a volatile series, the signal is effectively ‘understated’ or 
‘muted’, and an adjusted measure of standard deviation or an adjusted signal for volatile series should be 
investigated or alternatively the dynamic measure should be something other than standard deviation. 
 
Forecasts and Model Performance 
Crisis Signal Forecasts 
Crisis signal forecasts for each of the 144 iterations is  summarized based on the Signal Monitor, 
which is currently calibrated to forecast a crisis if two out of the nine indicators signal a crisis (other 
calibrations, whether they be linear, weighted could be adjusted to reflect the regulator’s views on 
contributors to fragility). In-sample forecasts are the reading of the Signal Monitor for the same year. 
Out of sample forecasts are the signal monitor reading of the year t-1.  
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A summary is presented below in Table 10 which shows the outputs for Theta1,Theta4 and Theta7 
(Ɵ!, Ɵ! and Ɵ!), by country, for the base case dependent variable scenario, using one standard 
deviation from a 3-year rolling mean, a 5-year rolling mean and a 10-year rolling mean, respectively. 
As can be seen, the output model shows that as early as 2004, clear signals were being given for a 
number of countries that vulnerabilities were building up. 
 
 
Table 10: Signal Extraction Forecasts for Theta1,Theta4 and Theta7 ( Ɵ!, Ɵ! and Ɵ!) – Base Case 
Dependent Variable 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
While Table 11 shows the Summary Consolidated Runs for the three dependent variable cases: 
namely the base case, high change dynamic threshold and low change dynamic threshold scenarios. 
 
No.	   Country 2005 2006 2007 2005 2006 2007 2005 2006 2007 2005 2006 2007 2005 2006 2007 2005 2006 2007
1 Australia 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2 Austria 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
3 Belgium 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0
4 Canada 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1
5 Czech	  Republic 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
6 Denmark 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
7 Finland 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
8 France 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1
9 Germany 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
10 Greece 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
11 Hungary 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
12 Iceland 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
13 Ireland 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
14 Italy 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
15 Japan 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1
16 Korea 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1
17 Luxembourg 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
18 Mexico 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
19 Netherlands 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
20 Norway 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
21 New	  Zealand 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1
22 Poland 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1
23 Portugal 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1
24 Slovakia 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
25 Spain 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
26 Sweden 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
27 Switzerland 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1
28 Turkey 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0
29 UK 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1
30 US 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Total 21 18 16 24 21 18 26 27 22 24 26 27 22 26 29 21 22 26
Signal	  Monitor	  Theta	  7
In-­‐Sample Out-­‐of-­‐Sample
Signal	  Monitor	  Theta	  4
In-­‐Sample Out-­‐of-­‐Sample
Signal	  Monitor	  Theta	  1
In-­‐Sample Out-­‐of-­‐Sample
 
 
23 
 
 
Table 11: Signal Extraction Forecasts for Theta1,Theta4 and Theta7 ( Ɵ!, Ɵ! and Ɵ!) – Summary Consolidated Runs for Dependent Variable 
Cases 
 Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
 
Noise-­‐To-­‐Signal	  Summary
2-­‐Year	  
Horizon*
3-­‐Year	  
Horizon** Noise-­‐To-­‐Signal	  Summary
2-­‐Year	  
Horizon*
3-­‐Year	  
Horizon** Noise-­‐To-­‐Signal	  Summary
2-­‐Year	  
Horizon*
3-­‐Year	  
Horizon**
2005 2006 2007 2005 2006 2007 2005 2006 2007
In-­‐Sample In-­‐Sample In-­‐Sample
Type	  I	  % 18% 33% 21% 4% 0% Type	  I	  % 20% 20% 25% 10% 0% Type	  I	  % 22% 28% 24% 4% 0%
Type	  II	  % 118% 80% 71% 92% 70% Type	  II	  % 360% 360% 188% 260% 156% Type	  II	  % 17% 16% 8% 40% 34%
Noise-­‐To-­‐Signal	  Ratio 1.44	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   1.20	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   0.91	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   0.96	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   0.70	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Noise-­‐To-­‐Signal	  Ratio 4.50	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   4.50	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   2.50	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   2.89	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   1.56	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Noise-­‐To-­‐Signal	  Ratio 0.22	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   0.22	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   0.11	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   0.41	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   0.34	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Out-­‐of-­‐Sample Out-­‐of-­‐Sample Out-­‐of-­‐Sample
Type	  I	  % 9% 33% 36% 0% 0% Type	  I	  % 0% 80% 50% 0% 0% Type	  I	  % 17% 28% 32% 2% 0%
Type	  II	  % 136% 80% 93% 96% 63% Type	  II	  % 400% 420% 225% 270% 150% Type	  II	  % 26% 16% 20% 44% 29%
Noise-­‐To-­‐Signal	  Ratio 1.50	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   1.20	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   1.44	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   0.96	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   0.63	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Noise-­‐To-­‐Signal	  Ratio 4.00	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   21.00	  	  	  	  	  	   4.50	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   2.70	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   1.50	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Noise-­‐To-­‐Signal	  Ratio 0.32	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   0.22	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   0.29	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   0.45	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   0.29	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Noise-­‐To-­‐Signal	  Summary
2-­‐Year	  
Horizon*
3-­‐Year	  
Horizon** Noise-­‐To-­‐Signal	  Summary
2-­‐Year	  
Horizon*
3-­‐Year	  
Horizon** Noise-­‐To-­‐Signal	  Summary
2-­‐Year	  
Horizon*
3-­‐Year	  
Horizon**
2005 2006 2007 2005 2006 2007 2005 2006 2007
In-­‐Sample In-­‐Sample In-­‐Sample
Type	  I	  % 9% 13% 21% 4% 0% Type	  I	  % 20% 20% 25% 10% 0% Type	  I	  % 13% 12% 20% 2% 0%
Type	  II	  % 145% 93% 86% 108% 73% Type	  II	  % 440% 460% 213% 290% 161% Type	  II	  % 26% 20% 12% 52% 38%
Noise-­‐To-­‐Signal	  Ratio 1.60	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   1.08	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   1.09	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   1.12	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   0.73	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Noise-­‐To-­‐Signal	  Ratio 5.50	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   5.75	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   2.83	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   3.22	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   1.61	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Noise-­‐To-­‐Signal	  Ratio 0.30	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   0.23	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   0.15	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   0.53	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   0.38	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Out-­‐of-­‐Sample Out-­‐of-­‐Sample Out-­‐of-­‐Sample
Type	  I	  % 18% 20% 7% 4% 3% Type	  I	  % 20% 40% 13% 10% 6% Type	  I	  % 22% 12% 12% 4% 3%
Type	  II	  % 145% 93% 100% 104% 70% Type	  II	  % 420% 460% 250% 280% 156% Type	  II	  % 30% 16% 20% 50% 36%
Noise-­‐To-­‐Signal	  Ratio 1.78	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   1.17	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   1.08	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   1.08	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   0.72	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Noise-­‐To-­‐Signal	  Ratio 5.25	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   7.67	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   2.86	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   3.11	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   1.65	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Noise-­‐To-­‐Signal	  Ratio 0.39	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   0.18	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   0.23	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   0.52	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   0.37	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Noise-­‐To-­‐Signal	  Summary
2-­‐Year	  
Horizon*
3-­‐Year	  
Horizon** Noise-­‐To-­‐Signal	  Summary
2-­‐Year	  
Horizon*
3-­‐Year	  
Horizon** Noise-­‐To-­‐Signal	  Summary
2-­‐Year	  
Horizon*
3-­‐Year	  
Horizon**
2005 2006 2007 2005 2006 2007 2005 2006 2007
In-­‐Sample In-­‐Sample In-­‐Sample
Type	  I	  % 9% 7% 0% 4% 0% Type	  I	  % 20% 20% 0% 10% 0% Type	  I	  % 26% 12% 0% 4% 0%
Type	  II	  % 118% 87% 107% 108% 73% Type	  II	  % 380% 460% 263% 280% 161% Type	  II	  % 26% 20% 16% 48% 37%
Noise-­‐To-­‐Signal	  Ratio 1.30	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   0.93	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   1.07	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   1.12	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   0.73	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Noise-­‐To-­‐Signal	  Ratio 4.75	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   5.75	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   2.63	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   3.11	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   1.61	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Noise-­‐To-­‐Signal	  Ratio 0.35	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   0.23	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   0.16	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   0.50	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   0.37	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Out-­‐of-­‐Sample Out-­‐of-­‐Sample Out-­‐of-­‐Sample
Type	  I	  % 9% 27% 14% 0% 0% Type	  I	  % 20% 40% 25% 0% 0% Type	  I	  % 22% 20% 12% 8% 5%
Type	  II	  % 136% 80% 107% 92% 60% Type	  II	  % 420% 400% 263% 240% 133% Type	  II	  % 30% 12% 20% 48% 32%
Noise-­‐To-­‐Signal	  Ratio 1.50	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   1.09	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   1.25	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   0.92	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   0.60	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Noise-­‐To-­‐Signal	  Ratio 5.25	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   6.67	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   3.50	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   2.40	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   1.33	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Noise-­‐To-­‐Signal	  Ratio 0.39	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   0.15	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   0.23	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   0.52	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   0.33	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Base	  Case
50	  bps,	  50	  bps,	  -­‐50bps	  and	  5	  bps
High	  Change	  Dynamic	  Threshold
100	  bps,	  100	  bps,	  -­‐100,	  and	  10	  bps
Low	  Change	  Dynamic	  Threshold
10	  bps,	  10	  bps,	  -­‐10bps	  and	  1	  bps
Theta	  1
Theta	  4
Theta	  7
1-­‐Year	  Horizon
1-­‐Year	  Horizon
1-­‐Year	  Horizon
Theta	  1
Theta	  4
Theta	  7
1-­‐Year	  Horizon
1-­‐Year	  Horizon
1-­‐Year	  Horizon
Theta	  1
Theta	  4
Theta	  7
1-­‐Year	  Horizon
1-­‐Year	  Horizon
1-­‐Year	  Horizon
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Noise-to-Signal Ratios and Forecast Performance (In-Sample and Out-of-Sample) 
The model performance for Theta1,Theta4 and Theta7  (Ɵ!, Ɵ! and Ɵ!), or one standard deviation from 
a 3-year rolling mean, a 5-year rolling mean and a 10-year rolling mean, respectively for the base 
case is summarized below. The 1-year NSTR is calculated based on whether a crisis was correctly called in 
the year following the forecast. However, measuring NSTR this way would result in an attempt to also predict 
crisis timing, which according to (Borio & Drehmann 2009) is not feasible. What if a crisis occurs after 1 year 
and 2 months from a signal being issued? Or 1 year and 3 months? In this case the NSTR would be indicating 
a false signal, whereas it is not true, predicting the timing however was what was not possible. The NSTR 
over a two year horizon, measures how correct the model was in signalling crises in the 24 months period 
after a crisis occurs, this is in line with Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999). This paper chooses to focus on the 
three year horizon, i.e. the ability of a signal to predict a crisis in the three years following a signal being 
issued. By using this focus, from the regulatory perspective, this means that the signal being evaluated could 
signal a crisis as early as 3 to 4 years before a crisis occurs.    
 
Performance in-sample shows small Type I errors ranging from 0% to 3%. The noise-to-signal ratio range, 
improves significantly to 0.7 from 1.6 times, over the three year forecast horizon as compared to the one year 
horizon, as the range of false alarms falls from 145% to 70%. The best in-sample model, is the 3-year rolling 
one standard deviation specification. 
 
Performance out-of-sample, is better than in-sample, in terms of overall noise to signal ratios, with the range 
falling from 1.6 to 0.6 over the three year forecast horizon as compared to the one year horizon. Levels of 
Type I errors are also very low ranging from a high of 36% to a low of 0% - or no misses. These results show 
a significant improvement compared to earlier work, for example the median NSTR in Borio & Drehmann 
(2009) applied to the same period 2004 – 2008, is 0.67 over the three year forecast horizon and the median 
Type I error is 70%. The outperformance also holds in comparison to KLR99, where Type I errors over a two 
year horizon range between 75% for the best individual indicator to 91% for the poorest individual indicator, 
whereas for this model, the corresponding figure is 4% to 0%. The best out-of-sample model is the 10-year 
rolling one standard deviation specification. 
 
Comparing the base case with the High Change Dynamic dependent variable specification and the low change 
dynamic threshold dependent variable specification shows that the best performing calibration is the base case 
calibration, which has an overall crisis incidence of 27%. Although the low change dynamic threshold seems 
to have better noise to signal indicators – it has an overall crisis incidence of almost 60%, which would render 
any model used by regulators invalid as it would be calling ‘crisis’ two thirds of the time and will lose all 
credibility. 
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Comparison between Model Results for the base case using ‘Near-Crises’ as the Dependent Variable 
and ‘Crises’ as per the Definition in Earlier Literature 
 
To evaluate the model performance had it been calibrated using the crises definitions in earlier literature as 
opposed to a ‘near-crises’ definition as proposed by this research, a run using the crises definition in earlier 
literature was done for the base case. The results are presented in the following table. 
 
Table 12: Summary Noise-to-Signal Ratios, Type I and Type II Errors, In-Sample, Out-of-Sample 
a) Model Output for ‘Near Crises’   b) Model Output for ‘Crises’ /Earlier Literature 
             
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
This shows clearly that the model with the new dependent variable specification outperforms substantially the 
model with the old dependent or crisis variable specification. This outperformance is across Type I and Type 
Noise-­‐To-­‐Signal	  Summary
2-­‐Year	  
Horizon*
3-­‐Year	  
Horizon**
2005 2006 2007
In-­‐Sample
Type	  I	  % 18% 33% 21% 4% 0%
Type	  II	  % 118% 80% 71% 92% 70%
Noise-­‐To-­‐Signal	  Ratio 1.44	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   1.20	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   0.91	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   0.96	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   0.70	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Out-­‐of-­‐Sample
Type	  I	  % 9% 33% 36% 0% 0%
Type	  II	  % 136% 80% 93% 96% 63%
Noise-­‐To-­‐Signal	  Ratio 1.50	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   1.20	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   1.44	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   0.96	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   0.63	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Noise-­‐To-­‐Signal	  Summary
2-­‐Year	  
Horizon*
3-­‐Year	  
Horizon**
2005 2006 2007
In-­‐Sample
Type	  I	  % 9% 13% 21% 4% 0%
Type	  II	  % 145% 93% 86% 108% 73%
Noise-­‐To-­‐Signal	  Ratio 1.60	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   1.08	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   1.09	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   1.12	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   0.73	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Out-­‐of-­‐Sample
Type	  I	  % 18% 20% 7% 4% 3%
Type	  II	  % 145% 93% 100% 104% 70%
Noise-­‐To-­‐Signal	  Ratio 1.78	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   1.17	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   1.08	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   1.08	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   0.72	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Noise-­‐To-­‐Signal	  Summary
2-­‐Year	  
Horizon*
3-­‐Year	  
Horizon**
2005 2006 2007
In-­‐Sample
Type	  I	  % 9% 7% 0% 4% 0%
Type	  II	  % 118% 87% 107% 108% 73%
Noise-­‐To-­‐Signal	  Ratio 1.30	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   0.93	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   1.07	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   1.12	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   0.73	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Out-­‐of-­‐Sample
Type	  I	  % 9% 27% 14% 0% 0%
Type	  II	  % 136% 80% 107% 92% 60%
Noise-­‐To-­‐Signal	  Ratio 1.50	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   1.09	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   1.25	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   0.92	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   0.60	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Base	  Case
50	  bps,	  50	  bps,	  -­‐50bps	  and	  5	  bps
Theta	  1
Theta	  4
Theta	  7
1-­‐Year	  Horizon
1-­‐Year	  Horizon
1-­‐Year	  Horizon
Noise-­‐To-­‐Signal	  Summary
2-­‐Year	  
Horizon*
3-­‐Year	  
Horizon**
2005 2006 2007
In-­‐Sample
Type	  I	  % 100% N/M 0% 50% 0%
Type	  II	  % 1100% N/M 950% 1350% 725%
Noise-­‐To-­‐Signal	  Ratio N/M N/M 9.50	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   27.00	  	  	  	  	  	   7.3
Out-­‐of-­‐Sample
Type	  I	  % 0% N/M 50% 0% 0%
Type	  II	  % 1150% N/M 1050% 1300% 650%
Noise-­‐To-­‐Signal	  Ratio 11.50	  	  	  	  	  	   N/M 21.00	  	  	  	  	  	   13.00	  	  	  	  	  	   6.50	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Noise-­‐To-­‐Signal	  Summary
2-­‐Year	  
Horizon*
3-­‐Year	  
Horizon**
2005 2006 2007
In-­‐Sample
Type	  I	  % 50% N/M 0% 50% 0%
Type	  II	  % 1250% N/M 1050% 1450% 725%
Noise-­‐To-­‐Signal	  Ratio 25.00	  	  	  	  	  	   N/M 10.50	  	  	  	  	  	   29.00	  	  	  	  	  	   7.25	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Out-­‐of-­‐Sample
Type	  I	  % 50% N/M 0% 50% 25%
Type	  II	  % 1200% N/M 1250% 1400% 700%
Noise-­‐To-­‐Signal	  Ratio 24.00	  	  	  	  	  	   N/M 12.50	  	  	  	  	  	   28.00	  	  	  	  	  	   9.33	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Noise-­‐To-­‐Signal	  Summary
2-­‐Year	  
Horizon*
3-­‐Year	  
Horizon**
2005 2006 2007
In-­‐Sample
Type	  I	  % 100% N/M 0% 50% 0%
Type	  II	  % 1150% N/M 1350% 1350% 725%
Noise-­‐To-­‐Signal	  Ratio N/M N/M 13.50	  	  	  	  	  	   27.00	  	  	  	  	  	   7.25	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Out-­‐of-­‐Sample
Type	  I	  % 0% N/M 0% 0% 0%
Type	  II	  % 1150% N/M 1250% 1200% 600%
Noise-­‐To-­‐Signal	  Ratio 11.50	  	  	  	  	  	   N/M 12.50	  	  	  	  	  	   12.00	  	  	  	  	  	   6.00	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1-­‐Year	  Horizon
Base	  Case
50	  bps,	  50	  bps,	  -­‐50bps	  and	  5	  bps
Theta	  1
1-­‐Year	  Horizon
Theta	  4
1-­‐Year	  Horizon
Theta	  7
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II errors as well as overall Noise-To-Signal-Ratios (NSTRs). For example the median NSTR in Borio & 
Drehmann (2009) applied to the same period 2004 – 2008 referred to earlier, is 0.67 over the three year 
forecast horizon and the median Type I error is 70%.   
 
For the three-year rolling mean, 1SD specification (Theta1), the new model has Type I errors of 4% for the 2-
year forecast horizon Vs Type I error of 50% for the specification with the old dependent crises definitions 
and an NSTR of 0.96 for the new definition versus 27 for the old definition, in sample. Out of sample, NSTR 
for the new model is 0.96 for the 2-year horizon and 0.63 for the 3-year horizon, versus 13.0 for the old 
definition and 6.5, respectively.  
 
For the five-year rolling mean, 1SD specification (Theta 4), the new model has Type I errors of 4% for the 2-
year forecast horizon Vs Type I error of 50% for the specification with the old dependent crises definitions 
and an NSTR of 1.12 for the new definition versus 29 for the old definition, in sample. Out of sample, NSTR 
for the new model is 1.08 for the 2-year horizon and 0.72 for the 3-year horizon, versus 28.0 for the old 
definition and 9.33, respectively.  
  
For the ten-year rolling mean, 1SD specification (Theta 7), the new model has Type I errors of 4% for the 2-
year forecast horizon Vs Type I error of 50% for the specification with the old dependent crises definitions 
and an NSTR of 1.12 for the new definition versus 27 for the old definition, in sample. Out of sample, NSTR 
for the new model is 0.92 for the 2-year horizon and 0.60 for the 3-year horizon, versus 12.0 for the old 
definition and 6.0, respectively.  
 
Thus, the comparison between the two sets of definitions also confirms the out-performance of the 10 year 
horizon model with near crises definitions. 
 
In summary, our model outperforms compared to earlier work in dependent variable specification, 
independent variable specification, methodology, forecasting performance out-of-sample and usability by 
regulators due to the longer lead time and room for utilization of their specific country experience in model 
calibration. 
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